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NOTES
INJUNCTIONS PURSUANT TO PUBLIC NUISANCE
OBSCENITY STATUTES AND THE DOCTRINE
OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS
Many states use public nuisance statutes' to regulate obscene expres-
sions.2 These statutes commonly grant judges the power to impose in-
junctions3 that restrain a "speaker" 4 from engaging in some form of
1. A public nuisance is "[a] condition dangerous to health, offensive to community moral
standards, or unlawfully obstructing the public in the free use of public property." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1107 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). See infra notes 60-97 and accompanying text.
2. The right of free expression is guaranteed by the first amendment of the United States
Constitution, which provides in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. This right is protected from state abridgement by
the fourteenth amendment, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). There are, however, judi-
cially recognized exceptions, one of which is the class of speech identified as obscene. See Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
The Supreme Court established a three part test to define obscene expressions in Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973):
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id at 24 (citations omitted). For a general review of obscenity regulation, see G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUrIONAL LAW 1344-80 (10th ed. 1980); F. SCHAUER, THE
LAW OF OBSCENITY (1976) [hereinafter cited as F. SCHAUER]; THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 941-44 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CONSTI-
TUTION ANALYSIS].
3. A number of constitutional issues surround the issuance of temporary injunctions en-
joining displays of films, sales of books, and speeches while an obscenity trial is pending. This
Note will confine its analysis, however, to the constitutional validity of injunctions entered after a
judicial finding of obscenity.
When a court determines that particular materials are obscene, it may permanently enjoin the
display of such material; in some states, courts may go further and close the premises for one year.
Thus, injunctions against obscene expressions may be permanent or temporary. See infra notes
60-97 and accompanying text.
4. "Speech" entitled to first amendment protection includes various forms of expression.
See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (live nude dancing); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (display of American flag with peace symbols attached); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (t-shirt with printed words); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (armbands worn in school); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952) (motion pictures).
"Speaker" as used in this Note means "exhibitor," "displayer," "picketer," etc. It refers to any
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speech a judge has already ruled obscene.' Some nuisance statutes pro-
vide for even more severe penalties,6 such as an order padlocking the
place of business where the obscene expression occurred.7 Such a re-
straint affects expressions other than those found obscene,8 implicating,
among other first amendment concerns,9 the doctrine of prior re-
straints.'" This Note examines the types of injunctions a state court
may issue pursuant to a public nuisance statute to abate obscene ex-
pression, which are consistent with the constitutional doctrine of prior
restraints.
person who engages in one of the forms of speech protected by the Constitution. The terms "ex-
pression" and "utterance" are used synonymously with "speech."
5. See, e.g., People ex re. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600,
130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. deniedsub nom. Van de Kamp v. Projection Room Theatre, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); State ex rel Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979), vacated, 445
U.S. 947 (1980), aSf'd, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981). See infra note 89 and accompanying
text.
6. See, e.g., Avenue Book Store v. City of Talmadge, 103 S. Ct. 356 (1982); State ex rel.
Kidwell v. U.S. Mktg., Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981), appealdismissedperstpulation sub
nom U.S. Mktg., Inc. v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982). See infra notes 96-97 & 110-20 and accom-
panying text.
7. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kidwell v. U.S. Mktg., Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981),
appeal dismissedper stopulation sub nom. U.S. Mktg., Inc. v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982).
8. A motion picture theater closed by the court for one year is precluded from exhibiting
other films that may not be obscene. See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
9. The scope of injunctions imposed against possibly protected speech also raises over-
breadth and vagueness issues. This Note will confine its discussion to the issue of prior restraints.
Most state courts that have considered the permissible breadth of injunctions entered pursuant to
public nuisance statutes have considered the major constitutional difficulty to be the doctrine of
prior restraints, See, e.g., People ex rel Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550
P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. deniedsub non. Van de Kamp v. Projection Room Theatre, 429
U.S. 922 (1976); Mitchem v. Schaub, 250 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1971); Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203
S.E.2d 153 (1974); Gulf States Theatres Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480 (La. 1973); State ex rel
Cahalan Diversified Theatrical Corp., 59 Mich. App. 223, 229 N.W.2d 389 (1975); State ex rel
Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979), vacated, 445 U.S. 947 (1980),
aj'd, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981); New Riviera Arts Theatre v. State ex rel Davis, 219
Tenn. 652, 412 S.W.2d 890 (1967).
10. Historically, a prior restraint took effect prior to the expression. The most common ex-
ample would be a censorship board or a licensing agency. If, before showing a film in a city, an
exhibitor needs to have the film approved by a censorship board, then that exhibitor is subject to a
prior restraint.
Currently, a prior restraint is an official action that chills speech prior to a finding that it is
unprotected, and therefore restrainable. In the final analysis, however, whether a restraint is a
prior restraint will depend upon "a pragmatic assessment of its operation in the particular circum-
stances." Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REv. 533, 539 (1951).
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I. THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS
A. A Brief History of the Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of
prior restraints in Near v. Minnesota' Near involved the constitution-
ality of a state court order abating The Saturday Press, pursuant to a
public nuisance statute, because the newspaper had published accusa-
tions concerning public officials. 2 The statute provided for the abate-
ment of any "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper" 3
unless the owner or publisher could convince the judge of the truth of
the accusations and the propriety of its motives. 4 In a 5-4 decision, the
Supreme Court held that the statute was an unconstitutional prior re-
straint.' 5 Quoting Blackstone, 6 Chief Justice Hughes stated, "the chief
purpose of the [first amendment] guaranty [is] to prevent previous re-
11. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The Court found the fact that the issue of previous restraints had
not come before it for 150 years, evidence of "the deep seated conviction that such restraints
would violate constitutional rights." Id at 718.
12. The newspaper alleged that a gangster engaged in various vices in the city of Minneapo-
lis, and that the Minneapolis Chief of Police, County Atto.ney, and Mayor neglected their respec-
tive duties with respect to this gangster. Id at 704.
13. Id at 701-02. See MINN. STAT. § 10123-1 to -3 (1927), citedin Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 701-02 (1931), which states:
Section 1. Any person who, as an individual, or as a member or employee of a firm, or
association or organization, or as an officer, director, member or employee of a corpora-
tion, shall be engaged in the business of regularly or customarily producing, publishing
or circulating, having in possession, selling or giving away,
(a) an obscene, lewd and lascivious newspaper, magazine or other periodical, .
is guilty of a nuisance, and all persons guilty of such nuisance may be enjoined, as here-
inafter provided.
283 U.S. at 701-02.
14. The Court stated that the availability of this defense to the owner or publisher did not
justify the prior restraint. "The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason for its existence,
does not depend. . . on proof of truth." 283 U.S. at 721.
15. Id at 722-23. Chief Justice Hughes stated that there were exceptions to the doctrine of
prior restraints. He enunciated four categories of speech that the state could regulate prior to their
utterance. The "exceptional cases" were: (1) words that would hinder a nation at war, e.g., ob-
structions of the draft and publications of troop and ship movements; (2) obscene publications;
(3) words that incite the violent overthrow of the government; and (4) "words that may have all
the effect of force." Id at 716. If obscene publications are exceptions to the doctrine, had the
action been brought under Section l(a) of the Minnesota statute, the issue of prior restraints
would not have arisen.
16. Blackstone said, "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications. ... 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 151, 152, cited in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
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straints upon publication."17  The state must find relief for abuses of
liberty of the press in subsequent punishment, not prior restraint.' 8
In Near, "prior restraint" meant an official, governmental obstruc-
tion of protected or unprotected speech prior to its utterance. The state
restrained future publication of the newspaper on the basis of a past
utterance.' 9 The statute operated as a censor on the publisher: if the
state did not like the contents of a periodical, it could abate future pub-
lication, disregarding the first amendment protection of the periodical's
future expressions.2" The Court expressed a decided preference that
speech, when regulated, be regulated by subsequent punishment. Chief
17. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). It seems unlikely that the chief purpose of
the first amendment speech clause was to prevent prior restraints since the classic form of prior
restraint, licensing statutes, had been abolished in England for almost 100 years. Actually, Eng-
land's licensing act expired in 1695, and the House of Commons did not extend it. The classic
licensing act in England, "The Licensing Act of 1662," proscribed any printing of any material
unless it was fully licensed by a state or clerical agent. No book could be imported or sold without
a license. Emerson, The Doctrine Of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 648 (1955).
18. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931).
19. The order prohibited the defendants from having in their possession any editions of the
Saturday Repiew that were found to be "malicious and defamatory." The order also denied them
the right to publish future editions of The Saturday Press, or to publish, circulate, or have in their
possession, "any publication, known by any other name whatsoever containing malicious, scan-
dalous and defamatory matter of the kind alleged in plaintiff's complaint herein or otherwise."
Id at 705.
The first part of the injunction restrained publication of materials which violated the statute.
The second part of the injunction abated publication of the newspaper itself. See MASON'S MINN.
STATS. § 10123-I to -3 (1927). One commentator referred to the injunction abating the newspaper
itself as a "hardcore" restraint, because such a restraint affects future publications without regard
to their constitutional protection. See Rendleman, Civilizing Pornography.- The Case For.An Ex.
clusive Obscenity Nuisance Statute, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 509, 550 (1977). For a discussion of
hardcore restraints see infra notes 107-23 and accompanying text. The third part of the injunction
has been referred to as a "standards" restraint. A standards restraint simply adopts the standard
embodied in the statute and thereby restrains all unlawful expression. For a discussion of stan-
dards restraints see infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
The three forms of injunction employed in Near are the types used in abating obscenity as a
public nuisance. States disagree on which of these injunctions operate as a prior restraint, and
therefore violate the federal constitution. See infra notes 98-123 and accompanying text.
20. The Court found this part of the injunction, the "hardcore restraint," most offensive. It
stated:
If we cut through mere details of procedure, the operation and effect of the statute in
substance is that public authorities may bring the owner or publisher of a newspaper or
periodical before a judge upon a charge of conducting a business of publishing scandal-
ous and defamatory matter. . . unless the owner or publisher is able. . . to bring com-
petent evidence. . . that the charges are true and are published with good motives and
for justifiable ends, his newspaper or periodical is suppressed and further publication is
made punishable as a contempt. This is the essence of censorship.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
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Justice Hughes' express approval of the use of libel laws to punish
those who abused the freedom of the press demonstrates that he con-
templated that the speech in question might be unprotected.2 Thus,
the statute's flaw lay in its form and application to this particular
utterance.
Under the Chief Justice's analysis there are three classes of speech.
The first class comprises speech protected by the first amendment. The
second class consists of unprotected speech a state may regulate by
prior restraint, such as words that would hinder a nation at war, ob-
scene publications, words that incite violent overthrow of government,
and words that have the effect of force.22 The third class consists of
unprotected speech which the government may regulate only by subse-
quent punishment-all unprotected speech not falling within the previ-
ous category.
The Chief Justice never clearly identified the reasons for distinguish-
ing between the second and third classes of speech. Justice Butler in
his dissent, however, questioned why lewd publications could be con-
stitutionally enjoined while malicious or defamatory expressions could
not.
23
In the years following Near, the doctrine of prior restraints became a
talismanic test used to strike down many state statutes that required
permits and licenses for public speakers.24 A statute constituted an un-
constitutional prior restraint if it imposed conditions upon a speaker,
prior to his utterance, that exceeded reasonable time, place, and man-
ner restrictions.25 Similarly, a statute was an unconstitutional prior re-
straint if it imposed conditions upon a speaker's utterance that were
subject to arbitrary administration because of excessive discretionary
authority vested in the administrator of the licensing or permit
21. But it is recognized that punishment for the abuse of the liberty accorded to the press
is essential to the protection of the public, and that the common law rules that subject the
libeler to responsibility for the public offense, as well as for the private injury, are not
abolished by the protection extended in our constitutions. . . . For whatever wrong the
appellant has committed or may commit, by his publications, the state appropriately
affords both public and private redress by its libel laws.
ld at 715 (citations omitted).
22. See supra note 15; infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
23. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 727 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
25. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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scheme.26
Current Supreme Court decisions indicate that a heavy presumption
exists against the constitutional validity of any scheme employing prior
restraints rather than subsequent punishment.2 7 Two of the Court's re-
cent decisions illustrate this proposition. In New York Times Co. v.
United States 8 ("The Pentagon Papers Case") the Court refused to re-
strain The New York Times from publishing certain materials the Fed-
eral Government thought inimical to the national security.2 9 Although
unable to articulate a uniform standard for prior restraints sought for
national security reasons, the Court held that the Government had
failed to overcome the "heavy burden of showing justification for the
imposition of such a restraint.""0 In Nebraska Press Association v. Stu-
26. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951):
We have here, then, an ordinance which gives an administrative official discretionary
power to control in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the
streets of New York. As such, the ordinance is clearly invalid as a prior restraint on the
exercise of First Amendment rights.
Id at 293.
27. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n.13 (1980) (per curiam); South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 419 (1971); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sulli-
van, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
28. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
29. The case involved the so-called "Pentagon Papers." The "Papers" consisted of a classi-
fied study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." The Govern-
ment contended that the material would "gravely prejudice the defense interests of the United
States or result in irreparable injury to the United States." United States v. Washington Post Co.,
446 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1971), a.r'dsub nom. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971). The district court refused to enjoin the materials and the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
30. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam). The Court affirmed in a short per curiam opinion.
The deep division in the Court over the particular standard by which to judge prior restraints for
national security purposes was reflected in the fact that each Justice felt compelled to write a
separate opinion. Justice Stewart maintained that the Government had not shown that disclosure
of the papers "would surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or
its people." Id at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White thought that although the Govern-
ment had not overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality that accompanied a prior restraint,
it could possibly proceed by way of subsequent punishment. Id at 733 (White, J., concurring).
Justices Black and Douglas made it clear they would never permit prior restraints. Id at 715
(Black, J., concurring); id at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Marshall pointed out that
Congress had twice refused to grant the power the Executive Branch sought in this case. Id at 747
(Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Brennan would issue a prior restraint sought by the Govern-
ment only if the publication would "inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss3/4
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art,3 the Supreme Court invalidated as a prior restraint a gag order
restraining the press from publishing certain facts concerning a widely
publicized mass murder case pending in the state court.32
A restraint exists when the government either obstructs or imposes a
condition upon expression. In its most extreme form, the restraint con-
stitutes an absolute ban against expression as in Near, New York Times
Co., and Nebraska Press. In a more traditional form, the restraint con-
sists of a licensing or permit scheme. Although not all prior restraints
are unconstitutional, 33 the courts carefully scrutinize such restrictions
because they prevent a speaker from entering the "marketplace of
ideas" rather than punishing him for misconduct while there.
B. Obscenity and the Doctrine of Prior Restraints
Courts react with less hostility to prior restraints of obscene expres-
sions.34 In Near, Chief Justice Hughes specifically excluded such ex-
pressions from the doctrine of prior restraints as one member of a class
an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea. ... Id at 726-27 (Bren-
nan, J.. concurring).
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Harlan and Justice Blackmun dissented from the per curiam opin-
ion, The dissenters emphasized the haste with which the case was treated by the judiciary. Id at
749 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id at 753 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id at 760-61 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). Justice Harlan, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined, stated
that '[d]ue regard for the extraordinarily important and difficult questions involved in these litiga-
tions should have led the Court to shun such a precipitate timetable." Id at 753 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
31. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
32. In order to protect the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial, a state district
judge prohibited the press from reporting five subjects: (1) material relating to the defendant's
confession to law enforcement officers; (2) statements the defendant made to other persons;
(3) contents of a note the defendant had written the night of the crime; (4) medical testimony given
at the preliminary hearing- and (5) nature and identity of the victims of the murder. The order
was to terminate once the jury was impanelled. Id at 543.
The Nebraska Supreme Court modified the district court's order so that it applied only to con-
fessions and admissions made to everyone except the press, and any other facts "strongly implica-
tive" of the accused. Id at 545.
In weighing the first amendment free press guarantee and the sixth amendment right to an
impartial jury, the Supreme Court found that alternatives were available to the Nebraska court
that would protect the defendant's sixth amendment rights; alternatives other than the "freezing"
effect of a prior restraint. "A prior restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an immediate and
irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication
'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time." Id at 559 (footnote omitted).
33 See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975); Bantam Books,
Inc. v Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 n.10 (1963); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1961).
See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
34. See, e.g.. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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of narrow exceptions.35 Other Justices have reasoned that prior re-
straints on obscenity are treated differently because obscene speech is
unprotected. 6 The Supreme Court appears to have settled on an ap-
proach to prior restraint of obscene speech that rests on the develop-
ment of specific procedural safeguards to guarantee that states restrain
only unprotected speech.37
Chief Justice Hughes set forth in Near four classes of exceptions to
the prior restraint doctrine:3" words that would hamper a war effort,39
obscene utterances,40 words advocating the violent overthrow of the
Government,4 and "words that may have all the effect of force."42 The
Chief Justice failed, however, to identify the source of the obscenity
exception.4 3 Although each excepted class comprised speech unpro-
tected at the time the Court decided Near,44 other unprotected catego-
ries45 existed which were not included.
Justice Brennan has offered another explanation: Courts treat ob-
35. 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931). See supra note 15; infra notes 38-43.
36. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), in which Justice Brennan,
concurring, stated that "cases regarding temporary restraints of allegedly obscene materials are
not in point. For those cases rest on the proposition that 'obscenity is not protected by the free-
doms of speech and press.'" Id at 726 n.* (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). See also
notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975); Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
38. See supra note 15 and text accompanying note 21.
39. Chief Justice Hughes referred to Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)-a case in
which no prior restraint was at issue-for the proposition that a government may prohibit words
that obstruct "its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the
number and location of troops." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
40. "On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against ob-
scene publications." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). The Court cited no case law in
support of this statement. Id
41. "The security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of vio-
lence and the overthrow by force of orderly government." Id
42. Id See also Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (191 1), in which the
Court stated that, "words are 'verbal acts' and as much subject to injunction as the use of any
other force whereby property is unlawfully damaged."
43. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). See also Emerson, supra note 17, at 660-61.
Emerson criticizes the Court for citing neither historical nor modern authority for the obscenity
exception. See supra notes 38-42 to compare the support offered by the Court for the other
exceptions.
44. For decisions prior to Near that assumed that obscene expression was unprotected under
the first amendment, see Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913); Public Clearing House v.
Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 508 (1904); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897); United States v.
Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 261 (1890); Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877).
45. See Emerson, supra note 17, at 660-61.
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scene speech differently than other speech for the purposes of prior re-
straint analysis because it is unprotected.46 This explanation, however,
is unsatisfactory; speech that is libelous is unprotected,47 yet a prior
restraint against this class of speech is not treated the same as a prior
restraint on obscene speech.48
A more practical explanation for the peculiar treatment of obscenity
in prior restraint analysis is that it generally appears in motion pictures,
magazines and books, but rarely, if ever, in newspapers. The form that
an utterance takes affects the degree of its protection.49 Reviewing
boards commonly prescreen movies to determine their fitness for a
community5 0 It is difficult to imagine, however, a board reviewing a
newspaper before its release to the public.-5 The Supreme Court has
approved the use of motion picture censorship52 boards, but has held
that certain accompanying procedural safeguards are necessary to
render any imposed prior restraint constitutional:5 3 (1) that the state
bear the burden of proof on obscenity; (2) that any restraint imposed
prior to judicial review be imposed briefly; and (3) that the state ensure
prompt final adjudication of the proceedings.5 4
The Supreme Court recently struck down a state statute as an uncon-
46 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 n.* (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
47 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chi-
cago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). Pemnekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946); Chaplinsky
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
48. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964). See also New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
49. See. e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (radio broadcast); Southeast-
ern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 562 (1975) (motion picture); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (television); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S.
43, 49 (1961) (motion picture); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) (motion
picture).
50. See. e.g., Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49 (1961) (upholding Chi-
cago's power to require submission of films prior to their public exhibition).
51 Motion pictures were not considered protected by the first and fourteenth amendments of
the federal constitution until 1951. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (mo-
tion pictures first brought under the protection of the first amendment). Verani, Motion Picture
Censorship and the Doctrine ofPrior Restraint, 3 Hous. L. REv. 11 (1965).
52 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1961).
53. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). In Freedman, the Court held that "a
noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional
infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a
censorship system." Id at 58.
54 Id
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stitutional prior restraint because it failed to meet the procedural safe-
guards outlined above. In Vance v. Universal Amusement Co. , the
Supreme Court held that a Texas public nuisance statute,56 when cou-
pled with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, "authorized a prior re-
straint of indefinite duration" because no limitation existed on the
period of time between the entry of a temporary restraining order and
final adjudication. 7 During that period, a state court could subject the
exhibitor to contempt sanctions for showing any films, even those with
non-obscene subject matter. 8 The Court found this scheme more on-
erous than a criminal statute prohibiting the same conduct because a
showing that the film was not obscene would be a defense in a criminal
proceeding, but not in a contempt proceeding for the violation of a
temporary injunction.5 9
II. PUBLIC NUISANCE REGULATION OF OBSCENITY
A public nuisance statute is a codification of the common law of
public nuisance.60 At common law, a public nuisance was a violation
of a public right.61 It consisted of doing62 or omitting to do 63 some-
55. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
56. See supra note 1; infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
The public nuisance statute provided that the use of a premises for "commercial manufacturing,
commercial distribution, or commercial exhibition of obscene material" was a public nuisance
and could be enjoined by the state. 445 U.S. at 310 n.2.
57. Under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure the state can obtain ex parle, a temporary
restraining order. Within ten days, a hearing on a temporary injunction is obtainable. Once the
state obtains a temporary injunction, there is no provision for swift final adjudication on the ob-
scenity issue. Id at 312.
58. After the state had shown probable success on the merits, the exhibitor would be subject
to contempt proceedings for violating the temporary injunction even if the film was ultimately
found not obscene. Id at 316.
59. The injunction at issue in Vance is referred to as a standards injunction. See .vpra note
19; infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court did not hold this type
of final injunction unconstitutional, it quoted the district court's opinion which stated that such an
injunction was indistinguishable from the standards injunction in Near. For the purpose of evalu-
ating the permissible scope of final injunctions entered pursuant to a public nuisance statute, this
Note assumes that the statute does not contain the procedural flaws present in the Texas statute.
60. For a general discussion of common law public nuisance, see W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 583-91 (4th ed. 1971); H. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN
THEIR VARIOUS FORMS, INCLUDING REMEDIES THEREFOR AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 37-105 (3d ed.
1893).
61. W. PROSSER, supra note 60, at 583; H. WOOD., supra note 60, at 34. "The term compre-
hends a miscellaneous and diversified group of minor criminal offenses, based on some interfer-
ence with the interests of the community, or the comfort or convenience of the general public."
W. PROSSER, supra note 60, at 583.
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thing that injured the public health,6 4 safety,65 welfare66 or morals 67 of
the community. 68
The idea that obscenity is a public nuisance emanates from the belief
that obscene expressions, even those that occur behind closed doors,
adversely affect the safety, welfare, or morals of the society.69 Al-
though many studies have failed to find any correlation between ob-
scenity and tangible harm to a community,70 courts agree that this
uncertainty does not render a legislature impotent to enact statutes pro-
scribing obscenity.7'
Approximately one-half of the states authorize civil injunctions
against obscene expressions based on a theory that obscene expressions
are a public nuisance.72 Some of those states have nuisance statutes
tailored to pornography. 73 Others simply maintain general public nui-
62. Eg., W. PROSSER, supra note 60, at 576 (obstruction of a public highway).
63. H. WOOD, supra note 60, at 38.
64. Eg., W. PROSSER, supra note 60, at 583-84 (keeping of a hogpen, diseased animals, a
malarial pond or carrying a child with smallpox along a highway).
65. E.g., id (storage of explosives, shooting off fireworks in the streets, harboring vicious
dog).
66. Eg., id (bad odors, smoke, dust and vibration, obstructing a highway or navigable
stream, being a common scold).
67. Eg., id (maintaining a house of prostitution or gambling, indecent exhibitions, bullfights,
public profanity).
68. A public nuisance is distinguished from a private nuisance in that a public nuisance af-
fects an interest common to the general public, rather than one or several individuals. W. PRos-
sER, supra note 60, at 585. The nuisance need not affect the entire community, only interfere with
those who come in contact with it while exercising a public right. Id
69. For discussions of the application of public nuisance statutes to obscenity, see Hogue,
Regulating Obscenity Through the Power to Define and.Abate Nuisance, 14 WAKE FOREST L. Rv.
1 (1978); Maltz & Hogue, On Keeping Pigs Out of the Parlor: Speech as Public Nuisance After
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 31 S.C.L. REv. 377 (1980); Rendleman, supra note 19; Note, Porno
Non Est Pro Bono Publico: Obscenity as a Public Nuisance in California, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
385 (1977).
70. See, e.g.. Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumption of Anti-Obscenity
Laws and the EmpiricalEvidence, 46 MINN. L. Rav. 1009, 1039 (1962). The author stated, "If one
insisted on supporting empirical evidence it would be hard to find a rationale for our obscenity
laws which squares with first amendment theory." id See also G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at
1344-46, 1352-56.
71. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatres I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). "[The] fact that a congres-
sional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people, including im-
ponderable aesthetic assumptions, is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional."
Id at 62.
72. Rendleman, supra note 19, at 521 n.66.
73. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-01
(Repl. Vol. 1976).
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sance statutes containing broad language decreeing that any act which
is injurious to the health or welfare of a community is an abatable nui-
sance.74 A few general nuisance statutes define a public nuisance as
any activity which is lewd or offensive to the senses.75 To ensure the
constitutionality of these statutes, 76 several state courts have imported
the standards and definitions found in the Supreme Court's decisions
on obscenity77 into their public nuisance statute.78
As an approach to abatement of obscenity, public nuisance statutes
present states four major procedural advantages not available under
penal statutes. First, in a civil nuisance proceeding, the burden of
proof on the state will be that of a preponderance of the evidence,7 9
rather than a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, required in crimi-
nal prosecutions.8 0 Second, because suits for injunctive relief are suits
in equity,8" no constitutional right to a jury trial exists.8 2 Third, an in-
junction regulates future conduct; it is personalized and precise. A
criminal statute punishes past conduct. Last, injunctions provide
remedial flexibility in contempt proceedings which is not generally
available in analogous criminal proceedings.8 3 Valuable practical con-
siderations also provide an incentive for employing civil sanctions. For
74. Rendleman, supra note 19, at 522.
75. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 370 (West 1970); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 1970).
76. Courts have an obligation to construe a statute in a constitutional manner when practica-
ble. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973);
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
77. If a nuisance statute uses the terms "lewd" and "offensive," the court may read in the
term "obscene" as defined in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See supra note 2.
78. See, e.g., People ex rel Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600,
130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. deniedsub nonL Van de Kamp v. Projection Room Theatre, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
79. A preponderance of the evidence means evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition. In other words, it is evidence which
as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. Braud v. Kinchen,
310 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 1975).
80. Although commentators agree that it is a difficult term to define, the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is a much tougher standard to meet than the standard of a preponder-
ance of the evidence. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 341 (E. CLEARY
2d ed. 1972). Cf. InRe Winshop, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (beyond a reasonable doubt standard is
a constitutional requirement of due process in criminal actions).
81. For a general discussion of injunctions, see 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS (1972).
82. The seventh amendment provides in part: "In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.. . ..." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. VII. Suits for injunctive relief are not "suits at common law." See generally
CONSTITUTION ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 1231-43.
83. Rendleman, supra note 19, at 511-12.
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instance, the criminal law seems too harsh to apply to possibly pro-
tected speech. 84  Threat of a jail sentence may chill speech more than
the thret of an injunction prohibiting publication or exhibition of cer-
tain materials.
Notwithstanding these advantages, a number of difficulties surround
public nuisance statutes. Many of the civil statutes are vague and over-
broad." Further, an action for a civil injunction resembles a criminal
proceeding in some respects, 86 yet lacks the procedural protections pro-
vided in criminal cases. For instance, civil injunction actions do not
require a jury trial87 which may result in unfairness.88  Finally, at least
one commentator criticizes the injunction as a usurpation of the legisla-
tive function by the courts. 89
One of the major difficulties with these statutesis the scope of final
injunctive relief that may be granted consistent with the doctrine of
prior restraints.90 Judges grant three basic types of injunctions in civil
84. Id at 512.
85. Id at 513. "The severity of criminal sanctions is itself partly responsible for the unpre-
dictability of obscenity law. . .[B]ecause few [merchants] are willing to risk imprisonment, the
precise standards. . . remain largely unknown." Id
This problem occurs more often with states that regulate obscenity through general public nui-
sance statutes than with states that draft public nuisance statutes which specifically relate to ob-
scenity. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78. These general public nuisance statutes have
"procedural anachronisms that have little place in litigation that raises sensitive first amendment
issues." Rendleman, supra note 19, at 523.
86. For instance, the state is a party to the suit and the suit is closely related to criminal
statutes which prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592, 604 (1975); Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836, 836-37 (1973).
87. See supra note 82.
88. This problem is especially acute in statutes authorizing hardcore restraints. The more
severe the restraint, the more important procedural requirements become.
89 Note, supra note 69, at 409-10. The author refers to the state court's application of a
general public nuisance statute to obscenity in People ex re. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre,
17 Cal 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. deniedsub nom. Van de Kamp v. Projection
Room Theatre, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
90. Compare State ex rel. Kidwell v. U.S. Mktg., Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622, appeal
dismissedper stipulation, 455 U.S. 1009 (1981) with Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153
(1974); State v. A Motion Picture Entitled "The Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 547 P.2d 760 (1976); Gulf
States Theatres of Louisiana, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480 (La. 1973); State ex rel Andrews
v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979), vacated and remanded, 445 U.S. 947
(1980). rea~fd, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981).
Compare also People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130
Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied sub noa. Van de Kamp v. Projection Room Theatres, 429 U.S. 922
(1976) with State ex rel. Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979), vacated
and remanded, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), reaft'd, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981). See infra notes
98-123.
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obscenity nuisance proceedings.9" The first, called a "tailored" injunc-
tion, dictates that specific material violates the law.92 The second pre-
cludes the future exhibition of "obscene" material.93 Courts refer to
this type as a" "standards" injunction 94 because it merely adopts the
standard of the statute the defendant violated.95 The last, called a
"hardcore" restraint, 96 closes the business of the defendant for a speci-
fied period of time or permanently abates the business or periodical
involved.97 States disagree on which of these injunctions violate the
doctrine of prior restraints.
III. FINAL INJUNCTIONS AND THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR
RESTRAINTS: STATE APPROACHES
The vast majority of states that employ public nuisance statutes to
regulate obscene expressions prefer the tailored injunction.9 It applies
only to films, books, or magazines which a judge has specifically de-
clared "obscene."
The Supreme Court recently refused to end a conffict among the
state courts when it denied certiorari in Avenue Book Store v. City of
Tallmadge.99 The issue inA venue Book Store involved the permissibil-
ity, as a prior restraint, of a standards injunction entered pursuant to a
public nuisance statute.'" The position that a standard's injunction is
a prior restraint receives support from Near v. Minnesota.t0 t The Court
91. See supra note 19; infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
92. This type of injunction will hereinafter be referred to as a tailored injunction because the
court tailors it to the materials in question. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Hall v. Commonwealth ex rel. Schroering, 505 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974).
94. Rendleman, supra note 19, at 550. See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
95. All states that allow civil proceedings against obscene exhibitors permit this form of in-
junction. See generally Rendleman, supra note 19.
96. See supra note 19.
97. Rendleman, supra note 19, at 550. See infra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 19.
99. Avenue Book Store v. City of Talmadge, 103 S. Ct. 356 (1982) (White J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
100. Id at 357 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
101. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See, e.g., State ex rel Kidwell v. U.S. Mktg., Inc., 102 Idaho 451,
456, 631 P.2d 622, 627,appeal dismissedper sipulation sub nom. U.S. Mktg., Inc. v. Idaho, 455 U.S.
1009 (1981); State ex tel. Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 265-66, 250 S.E.2d 603, 612
(1979), vacated and remanded, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), reaf'd, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981).
See supra note 19 & notes 11-22 and accompanying text. Although the Court in Near most
strongly objected to that part of the injunction which abated the newspaper itself, the Court also
criticized the standards injunction because it was in effect a prior restraint. Although the injunc-
tion did not force the publishers to clear material in advance of publication, the Court thought it
[Vol. 61:775
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in Near criticized the use of such an injunction, stating that it effec-
tively censored the speaker.' Advocates of this position maintain that
standards injunctions censor speakers by forcing them to check with
the court before engaging in expression that might violate the
injunction. 10 3
The states that argue in favor of the validity of standards injunctions
claim that they simply incorporate the terms of the civil or criminal
statute;'14 thus their constitutionality should not differ from the statutes
on which they are based.10 ' In addition, it is argued that the restraint is
not prior because it only punishes a person who actually has displayed
obscene materials. 106
Three state courts have approved the use of hardcore restraints, 10 7
although two of those courts have subsequently withdrawn their ap-
proval.108 A number of states have statutes that allow such a
would have that result. 283 U.S. 697, 712-13 (1931). See infra notes 131-41 and accompanying
text.
102. 283 U.S. 697, 712 (1930). Part of the difficulty stemmed from the vague terms of the
statute. "In the present instance the judgment restrained the defendants from 'publishing, circu-
lating, having in their possession, selling or giving away any publication whatsoever which is a
malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper, as defined by law.' The law gives no definition
except that covered by the words "scandalous and defamatory. ... Id at 712.
103. "[The defendant would be held, under penalty of punishment for contempt as provided
in the statute, to a manner of publication which the court considered to be 'usual and legitimate'
and consistent with the public welfare." Id at 713.
104. Hall v. Commonwealth ex rel Schroering, 505 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974) (af-
firming injunction to the extent it permanently enjoins defendants from violating obscenity laws).
105. See State ex rel Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 261, 250 S.E.2d 603, 609
(1979), vacated and remanded, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), reajfl'd, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443, 449
(1981).
106. Id
107. See supra note 19 and text accompanying notes 96-97.
108. See People ex rel Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130
Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied sub nom. Van de Kamp v. Projection Room Theatre, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); State ex rel Kidwell v. U.S. Mktg., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981), appeal dismissed by
stipulation sub non. U.S. Mktg., Inc. v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982); State ex rel. Cahalan v.
Diversified Theatrical Corp., 59 Mich. App. 223, 229 N.W.2d 389 (1975), rev'd sub nora. State ex
rel Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 396 Mich. 244, 240 N.W.2d 460 (1976).
The initial Busch opinion stated that "[w]e express no opinion upon the further question
whether the court may, in addition, either close the premises entirely or enjoin further 'obscene'
exhibitions regarding materials not yet adjudged obscene. Several cases suggest that further forms
of relief would be appropriate and constitutionally permissible." People ex rel Busch v. Projec-
tion Room Theater, 546 P.2d 733, 743, 128 Cal. Rptr. 229, 239 (1976) (In Bank) (citations omit-
ted).
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court modified the opinion by deleting the above quoted
language and replacing it with: "[W]e emphasize that the closing of such bookstores or theaters,
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restraint. 09
In the most recent approval of hardcore restraints, State ex rel
Kidwell v. U.S. Marketing,"10 the Idaho Supreme Court granted an or-
der abating an obscene bookstore as a public nuisance."' In approving
an order requiring the place of business to be padlocked for one
year," 2 the court claimed that the order operated as a subsequent pun-
ishment," 3 not a prior restraint." 4 It imposed no conditions upon the
bookstore owner." 5 The court analogized the action as one against
property," 6 as in a drug raid case; " the statute was acceptable because
it directed the forfeiture of property, not speech."' The court relied on
either temporarily or permanently,. . . constitutes an impermissible prior restraint. ... 17 Cal.
3d 42, 59, 550 P.2d 600, 610, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 338 (1976) (In Bank).
In Cahalan, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals on the
grounds that the statute authorizing padlocking orders did not apply to obscenity. State ex rel.
Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 396 Mich. 244, 250, 240 N.W.2d 460, 463 (1976). It
specifically refused to reach the prior restraints question. Id at 251.
109. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 52-406 to -412 (1949).
110. 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981), appeal dismissed by stoulation sub nom. U.S. Mktg.,
Inc. v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982).
111. The question presented on appeal was narrow. "The sole constitutional question
presented in this appeal is whether a district court may impose a one-year forfeiture of the use of
real property upon a finding, made pursuant to constitutionally acceptable procedures, that ob-
scene materials were disseminated on the property." Id at 453, 631 P.2d at 624.
112. Id 631 P.2d at 624. The trial judge refused to issue the order sought by the state on the
basis that the requested order would constitute an unlawful prior restraint and a violation of due
process.
113. The court pointed out that if the bookseller was imprisoned, he would not be subject to a
prior restraint, even though, as with the property forfeiture, it would have that effect. Id at 456,
631 P.2d at 627.
114. The court expressed dissatisfaction with existing analysis of the prior restraints doctrine.
Id at 455-56, 631 P.2d at 626-27.
The opinion also drew support from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in State ex rel.
Ewing v. "Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N.E.2d 911 (1974) (Brennan, Marshall and
Stewart, JJ., dissenting), dismissedfor want of substantialfederal question sub nomL Art Guild The-
atre, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923 (1975) (Ohio Supreme Court ruled one-year closure provision
constitutionally permissible method of controlling obscenity).
115. "[IThe manifest purpose of Idaho's one-year closing provision [is] not to prevent future
expression, but to punish past illegal conduct by depriving the violator of economic gain." 102
Idaho 451, 457, 631 P.2d 622, 628 (1981).
116. The injunction was directed against the business premises. See supra text accompanying
note 111.
117. "[C]ontemporary federal and state forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of property
that might be used in the conduct of a criminal enterprise." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974). See, e.g., United Siates v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890);
Dobbins' [sic] Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878).
118. On this basis, the court distinguished Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1930), in which
the challenged injunction restrained speech. See supra note 19.
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Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,19 in which the Supreme Court
held that a zoning ordinance providing for the dispersal of adult mo-
tion picture theaters, but which did not reduce their availability, was
not a prior restraint.' 20
Most states do not follow the reasoning employed by the Idaho
Supreme Court. Courts generally strike down statutes or injunctions
that include hardcore restraints as state remedies.12' They reason that a
hardcore restraint is indistinguishable from the impermissible restraint
imposed by the state court in Near'22 to abate publication of The Satur-
day Press. Though it is true that the owners of a paper subject to re-
straint can publish future issues under a different name, state courts
assert that effective restraint of future expression on the basis of past
expression constitutes a prior restraint.' 23
IV. EXPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND
THE VALIDITY OF FINAL INJUNCTIONS
The doctrine of prior restraints may be separated into two compo-
nents, the concept of temporal priorness and the concept of restraint.'24
An analysis of these components demonstrates that standards injunc-
tions do not violate the doctrine while hardcore injunctions are uncon-
stitutional prior restraints.125
119. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
120. In finding the statute was not an unlawful prior restraint, the Court stated, "There is no
claim that distributors or exhibitors of adult films are denied access to the market .... Id at
62.
121. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974); State v. A Motion Picture
Entitled "The Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 547 P.2d 760 (1976); Gulf States Theatres, Inc. v. Richardson,
287 So. 2d 480 (La. 1973); State ex rel. Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603
(1979), vacated, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), reaf'd, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981).
122. See supra note 19. Most state courts do not accept the distinction between abating a
publication and padlocking a building. See supra note 121; infra note 123 and accompanying text.
123. Cf. Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974). The court stated:
One obscene book on the premises of a book store does not make an entire store obscene.
The injunction closing this store and padlocking it as a public nuisance necessarily
halted the future sale and distribution of other printed material which may not be ob-
scene ... creating an unconstitutional restraint upon appellant.
Id at 613, 203 S.E.2d at 157.
124. Although the courts do not separate these concepts, traditional statements of the doctrine
make it clear that severable and distinct elements are involved: "The concept of prior restraint,
roughly speaking, deals with official restrictions imposed upon speech or other forms of expression
in advance of factual publication." Emerson, supra note 17, at 648 (emphasis added).
125. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
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A. The Concept of Temporal Priorness
The concept of temporal priorness focuses on the time at which the
state imposes the restraint. 126 A restraint may constitute both a prior
restraint and a subsequent punishment. For example, a hardcore re-
straint such as that involved in State ex re. Kidwell v. U.S. Market-
ing 127 may be termed punishment for speech already uttered;12 insofar
as it requires the speaker to obtain another building to continue busi-
ness, however, it is a condition on future expressions. 129
The fact that a restraint may be both prior restraint and subsequent
punishment does not obliterate the distinction between the two con-
cepts. A gag order such as that involved in Nebraska Press Association
v. Stuart 30 cannot constitute a subsequent punishment. It forbids cer-
tain words from entering the marketplace for fear of their effect. As
such, a gag order can only be temporally prior to the expression it
prohibits.
All subsequent punishment schemes may be considered prior re-
straints if one only considers their effect.' 3 ' Persons who know they
will be subject to punishment if they utter obscene speech may restrain
themselves from uttering "borderline" expressions.132 Thus, although a
court does not impose the restraint prior to the speech utterance, it has
prior effect. 33 The Supreme Court in Near extended the doctrine of
prior restraints to subsequent punishment schemes that were prior re-
126. One of the arguments in State ex rel Kidwell v. U.S. Mktg., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622
(1981) appeal dismissed by stioulation sub nom. U.S. Mktg., Inc. v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982),
emphasizes the temporal distinction. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
127. 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981) (forfeiture of business premises for one year), appeal
dismised by stipulation sub nom. U.S Mktg., Inc. v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982). See supra notes
19 & 110-18 and accompanying text.
128. The Idaho Supreme Court viewed it as solely subsequent punishment. 102 Idaho at 456,
631 P.2d at 627. See supra note 19.
129. The state would only use the punishment if it believed that the forfeiture would cause the
defendant economic hardship. If no economic strain would result the punishment would not serve
as a deterrent.
130. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
131. At least one commentator argues that the focus ought to be on whether a restraint is
prior-in-effect and not whether it is prior-in-form. Murphy, The Prior Restraint Doctrine in the
Supreme Court: .4 Reevaluation, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 898 (1976). This Note rejects that analy-
sis for the reasons stated infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
132. Borderline expressions constitute speech that is protected but given the severity of the
punishment the speaker will not risk an error in judgment. Presumably, the harsher the sanctions,
the more "chilling" their effect.
133. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
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straints in effect.'34 This unwarranted extension of the doctrine has led
to much of the confusion that exists today.135
Applying the doctrine of prior restraints to restraints that are prior in
effect, however, fails to address the underlying problem manifested in
the restraining effect; the court's ignore that which causes the prior re-
straint effect.' 3 6 If a court determines that a particular restraint is prior
in effect, it applies a heightened standard of review 137 and consequently
may strike down the statute as a prior restraint. The court thereby
leaves the legislature that drafted the restraint without guidance con-
cerning the precise cause of the prior restraint. 38 A vague statute often
constitutes a prior restraint in effect. 139  Individuals, uncertain of the
scope of the statute, overcautiously refrain from expressing certain
ideas. But the fault which needs correcting is the lack of clarity of the
statute's terms, not when the statutory penalties are imposed. The
analysis should concentrate on the cause of the restraining effect, not
on when the restraining effect occurs. 40 Application of the doctrine of
prior restraints in effect may lead to superficial, inadequate analysis.
Every unconstitutional restraint on speech is prior in effect, for it chills
protected speech in advance of its utterance.' 4' Thus, courts could
134. Near did not involve a licensing scheme. The Court, however, found the injunction
analogous to a licensing or censorship scheme because it thought that in order to obey the injunc-
tion forbidding publication of a "scandalous and defamatory" newspaper, the defendants would
have to clear future speech with the state court. As discussed earlier, the Court's major difficulty
involved the meaning of those statutory terms. See supra note 20.
Although "obscenity." even as defined in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), see supra note
2. is not a perfect test, there are a number of extant judicial interpretations that provide guides to
merchants of such material.
135. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
136- This situation arose in Near with respect to the standards injunction in issue. The terms
scandalous and defamatory are vague. The Court, however, analyzed the issue as if the problem
arose because the injunction was prior in effect. It really did not matter in Near that the injunc-
tion w'as prior in effect. The statute would have been struck down as vague no matter what its
temporal effect.
137. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
138. If a statute was struck down as a prior restraint, one would assume that the problem was
its orm, and that the legislature needed to alter when its terms took effect. But this is not always
so See mqfra text accompanying notes 136-40.
139. The difficulty would also exist with overbroad statutes, or any other constitutionally defi-
cient statute.
140. But see Murphy, supra note 131
141. Contrast the notion of "chilling," with the notion of "freezing" introduced by Chief Jus-
tice Burger. A prior restraint in effect may chill speech, but a prior restraint, insofar as it is an
obstruction to speech altogether, freezes it. Likewise, license and permit schemes freeze speech
until requisite conditions are met Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
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classify all unconstituti6nal restraints on speech as prior restraints caus-
ing the doctrine to lose all meaning.
Therefore, courts should strictly confine the concept of prior re-
straints to sittlations in which the government imposes an obstruction
to or condition on expression, and thereby exclude from the doctrine
situations in which an individual speaker may subjectively feel re-
strained.'42 A licensing scheme is a prior restraint; a criminal statute
punishing unprotected speech is not.' 43
B. The Concept of a Restraint
Restraints on speech utterances are of two types, absolute and condi-
tioned. An absolute restraint, as the name implies, absolutely pre-
cludes speech from being utiered.'"1 A conditioned restraint, on the
other hand, requires th4 9peaker to meet certain conditions before
speaking.' 45 Both restralits 'xist in any order or injunction. 46 A gag
142. Effect will be important for the purposes of analyzing whether a restraint exists or not. It
is only in the context of the temporal aspect of the doctrine that effect analysis has no place. The
only issue should be when the restraint is imposed. The question of whether speech is chilled is
properly an inquiry into the second element of prior restraints analysis, which focuses on the
restraint concept. See infra notes 144-159.
143. The traditional prior restraint is a form of censorship. The concept of temporal priorness
in form exists because the speaker must have his speech cleared by the government or because the
government gags the speaker with respect to certain topics. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (gagging press with respect to facts of mass murder); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (refusing to permit exhibition of "Hair"); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (refusing to restrain New York Times and
Washington Post from publishing classified military study); Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (refusing to restrain leaflets in community where target of leafletting
lived); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (invalidating Maryland motion picture censor-
ship statute); Bantam BookS, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (Rhode Island Commission
which compiled list of objectionable publications and threatened publisher with criminal prosecu-
tion was prior administrative restraint).
The concept of temporal priorness in form runs throughout the cases citedabove. There were
no arguments that the statutes chilled speech, forbade it altogether, or placed conditions on its
utterance.
144. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'fi v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553, (1975); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 714 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1971).
145. E.g., a licensing or permit scheme. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52
(1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 61-63 (1963); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355
U.S. 313, 317 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 290-91 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 269-70 (1951); Cantwell y. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 298 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147, 149 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 444-45 (1938).
146. See, eg., State ex rel Kidwell v. U.S. Mktg., Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981)
appeal dismissed by stipulation sub nom. U.S. Mktg., Inc. v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982). In
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order is an absolute restraint on the particular information re-
strained.'47 It is also a conditioned restraint on persons desiring to ut-
ter the prohibited speech; it permits entrance to the marketplace of
ideas, but does not allow expression of the particular proscribed
utterances. 148
The precise degree of restraint necessary for a prior restraint is a
question without a clear answer. At a bare minimum the restraint must
inhibit speech.' 49  But not all restraints that inhibit speech constitute
unconstitutional prior restraints.'t 0 Placing someone in jail for violat-
ing the law surely inhibits their future expression, but does not consti-
tute a restraint for the purposes of prior restraint analysis. 15' Requiring
a publishing company to register with the state in accordance with Blue
Sky Laws or to conform to the antitrust laws may inhibit speech but
does not constitute a restraint for purposes of the doctrine. 5 The
Supreme Court has held, for example, that zoning ordinances are not
restraints for purposes of the doctrine.'53
Kidwell, the order that the business be padlocked was absolute in terms of its effect on that build-
ing as a medium of expression. But the order was conditioned, with respect to the person who
previously used that building for expression, on the speaker's ability to survive the economic con-
sequences of a padlocking or to secure adequate alternative premises.
147. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541 (1976) (gagging press with
respect to facts of mass murder). See supra notes 31-32.
148. This conditional entrance to the marketplace presented a particularly difficult problem in
the Near case, because the only purpose of The Saturday Press was to discuss political corruption.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 724 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting).
149. If there is no restraint, there can be no prior restraint. See Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976) (upholding zoning ordinance because "[t]here is no claim
that distributors or exhibitors of adult film are denied access to the market...").
150. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). These are generally restraints di-
rected against conduct other than speech. Publishing companies are "affected no differently from
any other commercial enterprise." See infra text accompanying notes 151-53.
151. See, e.g., Stateexrel. Kidwell v. U.S. Mktg., 102 Idaho 451,456, 631 P.2d 622, 627 (1981)
appeal dismissed by stipulation sub nora. U.S. Mktg., Inc. v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982); State ex
rel Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 59 Mich. App. 223, 237, 229 N.W.2d 389, 396 (1975),
re,'d on other grounds, 396 Mich. 244, 240 N.w.2d 460 (1976).
This problem could be viewed from two perspectives. One could argue, as in Kidwell, that
incarceration is not prior. Alternatively, one could argue that there are policy reasons, such as
deterrence, against considering incarceration a restraint for purposes of the prior restraint
doctrine.
152. See supra note 143.
153. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1975). See supra note 119-20 and
accompanying text. "The constraints of the ordinance with respect to location may indeed create
economic loss for some who are engaged in this business. But in this respect they are affected no
differently from any other commercial enterprise that suffers economic detriment as a result of
land-use regulation." 427 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring).
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At the other end of the spectrum, it is clear that an absolute prohibi-
tion of the expression of certain material, such as a gag order, is a re-
straint. But absolute restraints154  against property, or against
businesses, are conditional restraints against speakers. A padlocking
order is an absolute prohibition against the building, but it is a condi-
tional prohibition against the speaker who used that building as a fo-
rum for expression.' 55 This person may be absolutely restrained,
however, if he cannot afford the business consequences of such a pad-
locking.156 In such a case, the order clearly restrained that speaker.
The development of a definition of restraint for purposes of the doc-
trine of prior restraints requires an analysis of the particular facts of
each case.1 57 Restraints analysis questions whether the state has effec-
tively gagged the speaker by punishing for past conduct in a manner
that has the effect of silencing him.1 58 If so, policy reasons, such as de-
terrence of future violations, may justify letting the punishment
stand. 15 9
C. Standards Injunctions
Standards injunctions are certainly prior in nature. They regulate
future conduct. But they are not restraints. A standards injunction es-
sentially states that a speaker may break the laws but will be subse-
quently punished. As such it is analogous to application of the
antitrust laws to newspapers. 60 Assuming the procedural defects of the
Texas statute held unconstitutional in Vance '6 ' are not present, a stan-
dards injunction is no more than a criminal sanction applied after the
154. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
155. This condition is not functionally different from a licensing or permit scheme. The gov-
ernment has placed a condition on this speaker's future expressions.
156. Thus, the situation is distinguishable from Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976), in which there was no indication that any speech would be restrained. See stpra
note 149.
157. For example, whether a fine is a prior restraint will depend upon the size of the fine and
the defendant's ability to pay. For a very wealthy defendant, a padlocking order may not be a
restraint. But that would be true only in extreme cases.
158. If a defendant has been silenced, censorship has occurred; censorship is the essence of
prior restraint. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
159. The importance of the policy of deterrence is one possible explanation for why imprison-
ing a defendant is not a prior restraint. See supra note 147. The first and fourteenth amendments
are not absolute and may yield to other interests in certain circumstances. Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1975).
160. See supra note 149.
161. 445 U.S. 308 (1980). See supra note 55.
[Vol. 61:775
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss3/4
Number 3] PRIOR RESTRAINTS
event. 162 The only condition that it imposes on a speaker is that the
speaker not violate the laws. Thus, it clearly does not constitute a re-
straint for the purposes of the doctrine of prior restraints.
. Hardcore Injunctions
A hardcore injunction such as a padlocking provision is clearly prior
under the above analysis. Though it only closes a place of business for
a specified period of time, it actually imposes a conditional restraint
which may become absolute. It allows the speaker to continue to ex-
press ideas, but not from that building, or through that business. 163 Fu-
ture expression is therefore conditioned on an ability to replace the
building or business. To the extent that it may not be economically
feasible for the speaker to move his place of business, the speaker is
silenced with regard to the particular product he was brokering in the
marketplace. Thus, the state has effectively censored the speaker.1 64
This restraint is distinguishable from the zoning restraint in Young ,65
in which there was no allegation that anyone would be unable to meet
the zoning requirements. 166 The hardcore injunction has a much more
severe practical effect than a zoning ordinance.' 67
V. CONCLUSION
A hardcore injunction clearly constitutes a prior restraint as that doc-
162 An injunction may be more severe than a criminal statute in the sense that certain proce-
dural safeguards may not be present, e.g., right to jury trial. See supra note 82. This argument
fails because the procedural safeguards are part of the state's rules of civil procedure; if those rules
do not meet the safeguards enunciated in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), then the
statute itself will fail. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. See also Vance v. Universal
Amusement Co., 434 U.S. 308 (1980). The failure would not be the form of the injunction, but
rather, the underlying statute. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
163. The argument here is not that a speaker has a right to certain facilities as a speaker, but
rather, that to deprive the speaker of the particular building is equivalent to obstructing future
expression. The order is equivalent to censorship in that it reduces the speaker's access to the
marketplace.
164. A state such as Idaho would not use a padlocking provision as subsequent punishment
unless the legislature thought it would restrain the defendant. See supra notes 110-18 and accom-
panying text. If a padlocking order would have no effect on a defendant, the state would have
little reason to use it.
165. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
166 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
167 In the Eoung situation the only difficulty would be finding a building in an area which
permits the particular business (and thus expression) pursuant to local zoning laws. A hardcore
injunction requires that a defendant suffer the economic loss of use of the building for one year.
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trine is traditionally defined. The states find hardcore restraints advan-
tageous for their censorship effect.' 68 A standards injunction, however,
does not constitute a prior restraint. Although it may have the effect of
inhibiting speech, it does not impose a restraint on the speaker as
speaker; it simply mandates that the speaker not violate the laws.
Courts may constitutionally order standards injunctions as final orders
after a finding that a particular business or individual exhibited ob-
scene materials. The states find standards injunctions advantageous
not because they censor the person enjoined, but because they place the
speaker on notice of the boundaries of protected speech.'6 9
Steven C. Nickerson
168. See supra note 162. It is useful to contrast the state interests in employing hardcore and
standards restraints. Hardcore restraints are adopted for their damaging effect upon a defendant.
They are intended to punish and deter. By definition they are restraints. Standards injunctions,
however, are adopted by the state because of the procedural advantages they offer to the state, not
because of the injury they cause to the defendant. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
169. Rendleman, supra note 19, at 556. "An injunction forbidding 'obscenity' or specifying
standards is distinguishable from criminal punishment because it gives the defendant one free
bite: a court finds the defendant's activity illegal but withholds punishment until he commits a
second violation." Id In his proposed statute, Rendleman allows only tailored injunctions. His
argument is that because of the inherent imprecision of obscenity, a standards injunction would
"chill . . the marketplace of ideas." Id at 557.
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